INTRODUCTION
Today in every Australian jurisdiction with the exception of the Northern Territory, specific legislation governs adult reproductive choice with respect to family creation through surrogacy. This legislation renders commercial surrogacy an illegal act, punishable by fines and/or imprisonment.
The crime of commercial surrogacy was first introduced in Victoria in 1986. The introduction of this crime and its subsequent adoption by all other Australian jurisdictions with specific surrogacy legislation has never been questioned by policy makers 1 and as a consequence has not been opened to public debate. This dearth of discussion surrounding the criminalisation of commercial surrogacy is remarkable in light of the number of public inquiries held across Australian jurisdictions into surrogacy. More than 24 inquiries have been undertaken between 1983 and 2009 with even the most recent wave of legislative reform inquiries into surrogacy, held by the Commonwealth, Tasmania, South Australia, New South Wales and the Victorian governments, 2 -specifically excluding the issue of commercial surrogacy from each respective terms of reference. This article questions this ongoing application of criminal prohibitions to commercial surrogacy in Australia. It begins by evaluating the legislative prohibition introduced in the 1980s and argues that the current offence is based upon outdated reproductive policy which fails to reflect factors such as: changed understandings of infertility; a 'new' global marketplace; and an altered social and technological environment. Further, the article observes that the current legislative criterion detailing an illegal commercial surrogacy expenses are both ambiguous and without uniform definition across Australian jurisdictions. Ultimately, the article calls for review of the offence of commercial surrogacy.
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THE RATIONALE FOR CRIMINALISING COMMERCIAL SURROGACY Why the 'need' for Australian surrogacy legislation in the 1980s?
Surrogacy has a long history. Australian Torres Strait Islanders have customary adoption practices which may from a Western perspective be labeled as surrogacy; 6 the practice has been documented through a biblical reference to surrogacy in Genesis; and there are various historical examples of surrogacy occurring such as the private diaries of Winston Churchill's wife Clementine revealed that she offered to give the couple's fourth child to Lady Jean Hamilton, a close family friend, unable to conceive. Kingdom -attracted a great deal of international media and public interest. These judicial decisions catapulted surrogacy onto the legislative agenda in most developed countries resulting in a plethora of international government commissions of inquiry into surrogacy in the 1980s.
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The central issue raised by Baby M and Baby Cotton -the payment of money for surrogacy and the issue of whether a surrogacy agreement could be legally enforced as a contract -framed much of the ensuing debate over surrogacy. At that time in Australia it was widely assumed 11 that commercial surrogacy contracts would be unenforceable at common law due to the public policy heads of sexual immorality; 12 a contract prejudicial to family life or baby-selling. 13 Similarly to all other common law jurisdictions however, Australian courts did not have jurisdiction to criminally punish adults for entering into surrogacy arrangements for commercial gain. The use of payment to create a family through a surrogacy arrangement could therefore be prohibited by criminal sanction in Australian jurisdictions only through legislative intervention.
The early legislation introduced in Australia fills this gap. Between 1986 and 1988 prohibition legislation was introduced in Victoria, South Australia and Queensland.
14 In each of these jurisdictions the purpose of the surrogacy legislation was to impose criminal penalties upon individuals or organizations facilitating commercial surrogacy arrangements. 15 Today, the absence of regulation of commercial surrogacy at a federal level means that surrogacy legislation remains state and territory specific. 19 The committee was established to 'consider whether the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF) should be conducted in Victoria and if so, the procedures and guidelines that should be implemented in respect of such processes in legislative form or otherwise.' Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising From In Vitro Fertilization' Interim Report September 1982, at 1.1. The Committee regarded 'surrogate motherhood in IVF' as a 'separate matter' see n 17, at 4. The Committee acknowledged that the practice can take place outside of IVF. The Committee decided to review all aspects of the subject while noting that non-IVF aspects of surrogacy were specifically outside the Committee Terms of Reference, n 4 at 49-50.
Relating to Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilisation and Other Related Matters
focused upon surrogacy only in so far as it related to AI and IVF. 20 While neither inquiry recommended the application of criminal law to surrogacy, explicit disapproval of the practice was expressed. The Waller Report 'recommends that surrogacy arrangements shall in no circumstances be made at present as part of an IVF programme in Victoria' 21 observing that '[T]he Committee has come to the conclusion that surrogate mother arrangements where fees are paid are, in reality agreements for the purchase of a child, and should not be countenanced.' 22 Similarly to the Victorian Waller Report, the Demack Report states that 'it would not be desirable…to make surrogacy arrangements criminal offences…'. 23 However the Committee then goes on to note that '…it should be made illegal to advertise to recruit women to undergo surrogate pregnancy, or to provide facilities for persons who wish to make use of the services of such women.' …will effectively pre-exempt the recommendations of the Waller Committee. For myself, I have indicated, when introducing the Bill, that at least in regard to surrogacy, we are prepared to do that. There does not seem to be much 20 Demack Report, n 18, Volumes I and II. 21 Waller Report n 17, at 54 para 4.17. 22 Waller Report n 17, at 50 para 4.6. While the Committee did not recommend the application of criminal law to surrogacy it did note that '[S]ome members of the Committee consider that the criminal law should be amended to make it clearly an offence to enter into, or contribute in any way to, a commercial surrogacy agreement.' at 51, para 4.7. 23 Demack Report, n 18 at 117. 24 Ibid 118. 25 This has now been repealed and the Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) introduced which decriminalises altruistic surrogacy. community debate about surrogacy. I believe the provisions in the Bill meet with general acceptance and appear to have met with the general acceptance of honourable members. 26 This absence of public consultation on surrogacy is confirmed by the Honourable JR Kirner who notes in the same debate that ' [T] he Bill also provides answers to a number of questions that are…now community questions and not just questions for Parliament…the Bill does not pre-empt community discussion on the final Waller report, except in the case of surrogate motherhood.' 27 There is difference between the parliamentary debate in Victoria and Queensland. In Victoria surrogacy is treated moderately -almost dismissively -whereas in Queensland the debate is one of condemnation and moral outrage, best summarized by comments such as those form the Honourable PR McKechnis who states in the second reading speech for the Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 that '[I]t is the strong belief of members of the Queensland Government that to use or to pay another human being to reproduce is the ultimate in dehumanisation. We are of the opinion that a baby must not be treated as a commodity to be purchased. It must not be the subject of traffic in any form.'
28 Mr Stephan (Member for Gympie) similarly observes that:
Honourable members should ask themselves whether they want a society where there is a "rent a womb"; where women are used as incubators; where the surrogate mother seeks to deny her parental responsibility; where a child would be created deliberately to be abandoned by one of its parents; and where women of low socio-economic status may seek to become "breeders" for economic reasons. Alternatively, is the future of the world one where carrying a child and the physical risks and emotional upheaval associated with pregnancy and childbirth seem to be ignored or denied; where people are used in this matter as a means to ends; and where the intimate relationship between mother and child is dehumanized to a working relationship between a unit of manufacture and its product? 29 The stark difference in the tone of parliamentary debate in Victoria and the moralistic condemnation in Queensland may be explicable through jurisdictional differences and/or external events such as the timing of the UK Baby Cotton case in 1985 and the US Baby M case of 1986 as these high profile cases occur after the Victorian legislation is introduced and before the parliamentary debates occur in Queensland. Regardless however of difference in tone, the result of the debate by legislatures in both jurisdictions is to render commercial surrogacy a criminal act and thus largely ignore the recommendations of their respective parliamentary inquiries. 26 Hon JH Kennan Legislative Council, 11 October 1984, 770. On this point the Hon JV C Guest states with respect to Kennan's comment that '..it is very odd to hear from a noted civil libertarian that because people in the community regard something as offensive then it should be stopped. ' Of course there is no requirement for parliaments to adhere to the findings of government inquiries. Indeed at the time there are common issues across both jurisdictions -peculiar to commercial surrogacy -which render understandable this divergence between parliament and its reports. Firstly, on an international level there was significant movement between the recommendations of the Waller and Demack Reports and the passing of legislation in Victoria and Queensland. In particular the Warnock Committee 30 in the UK, established in July 1982, reported its findings 31 on the application of criminal penalties to surrogacy. These recommendations were influential in Australia. 32 Secondly, the jurisdictions of Victoria and Queensland followed what can now (with benefit of hindsight) be viewed as an established legislative pattern across jurisdictions dealing with biomedical innovation. This pattern is to respond to biomedical developments (such as embryo freezing; 33 cloning, xenotransplantation and surrogacy) by initially applying the heavy handed legal regulatory model of criminal law and then consequently adopt more nuanced and flexible regulatory frameworks.
Were the Victorian and Queensland 1980 criminal prohibitions justified?
The issue as to whether the current application of criminal law to commercial surrogacy is justified is however an essentially different question as to whether the imposition of such a penalty in the 1980s was understandable. Criminal penalties, the most serious sanctions in the Australian legal system, are arguably only justified in liberal theory when the punishment imposed is necessary to prevent harm. 34 As Mill states, a free society should protect '…[the] liberty of tastes and pursuits…without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong.' 35 It is therefore desirable that the criminal act of commercial surrogacy originated to prevent harm or to ensure the safety of the population. In other words criminal restrictions on procreative liberty may be justified if surrogacy substantially burdens others. 36 Optimally, in a liberal democratic society such as Australia, the prevention of an exercise in personal choice should be supported by a rational explanation for government action. The continuing prohibition upon commercial surrogacy which renders this reproductive opportunity 37 a criminal act must therefore be grounded in reason or, at least, not be unreasonable. Whether the criminalization of surrogacy is based upon reason has been questioned by even the original architects of criminal policy. For example Dame Warnock, the Chair of the Warnock Report has altered her 1980s position on surrogacy stating in 2002 that 'I now believe that it would be better if the process were officially regulated, and more openly discussed between doctors, prospective parents, surrogates, and, later, with the resulting children.' 38 She goes on to note that ..the hasty legislation was rushed through in the UK at the end of a Parliamentary session in 1989..on a wave of revulsion against anything so vulgar and exploitative as the American commercial companies who were hovering on the shores of Britain. The general sentiment was 'not in our backyard'. If people wanted to enter into surrogacy contracts, let them go across the Atlantic to do it. I do not remember any very serious discussion of whether or not surrogacy was so intrinsically so immoral, or its consequences so socially disastrous, that legislation against it must be enacted…I increasingly believe that one social ill we need to be aware of is that of excessive governmental regulation. If surrogacy were allowed in the UK, on the American model, though some people might be offended, I doubt if we would be harmed…I suspect that the legislation hastened through at the time of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology was mistaken.
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The current Australian legislative criminal prohibition of commercial surrogacy similarly originates from this 1980s climate of fear.
JUSTIFYING A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
In 1984 in the Victorian Parliament Mr F P Sheehan, the member for Ballarat South, states in relation to the passage of the Victorian Bill which criminalized commercial surrogacy that, ' [O]n a personal level, dealing with the Bill is like walking into a dark room and not knowing where all the furniture is placed.' 40 To date there has still been no effort by any Australian legislature to ascertain where the furniture is placed with respect to commercial surrogacy or to acknowledge that even the room itself may have substantially altered in the almost three decades since the policy was implemented.
It is now necessary that such efforts be made -review of the application of criminal penalties is required for the following reasons:
A changed global, social and technological environment
In the thirty years since legislation was introduced the surrogacy landscape has fundamentally altered. Today a myriad of factors have lead to a increasing 41 44 and a more accepting public attitude towards the application of such technology. 45 The result is that perceptions as to treatment for infertility is very different today to what it was in the 1980s when criminal prohibition of commercial surrogacy was introduced.
For example, there is now a social phenomenon of individuals interacting across jurisdictions in what may be described as a global reproductive network for the chance to parent a child. 46 In Australia legal restrictions on access to ART for surrogacy over the past three decades has resulted in 'medicine by postcode' 47 where ineligible parents travel interstate for treatment. Indeed fertility services in restricted states have actively facilitated such treatment. 48 The application of criminal law to commercial surrogacy has also resulted in Australians engaging in international surrogacy arrangements 49 with commercial surrogacy and egg donation being well established in the US and rapidly evolving in countries such as India. Policymakers do acknowledge that public opinion in the area of reproductive regulation is important. For example in the 1980s the Victorian Attorney-General believed the Waller Report to be of such significance that he announced the report was to be the subject of community evaluation and consultation between the time it was available in September and in December. This caused the opposition Shadow Minister for Health to state '..I am somewhat troubled that, as Parliament would be rising early this year, the House would be required to deal with the Bill before the outcome of the community consultation was fully available for members of Parliament of all parties.' 51 The passage of this Bill through parliament meant that 'honorable members are being required to debate the measures before we know the outcome of community consultation.'
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The importance attached to public opinion is also acknowledged in the regulation of commercial surrogacy. Where mentioned it appears that the belief of the 1980s policymakers was that criminalization of commercial surrogacy reflected community opinion. For example, the South Australian inquiry began from the premise that 'the correct approach is to devise legislation which reflects the collective conscience of society' 53 and the UK Warnock Report concluding that '[T]here are strongly held objections to the concept of surrogacy, and it seems from the evidence submitted to us that the weight of public opinion is against the practice'.
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This assumption that the Australian community views commercial surrogacy as requiring criminalisation is however made in the absence of evidence. The data that was available in the 1980s opens to question the veracity of this perception as to the public being antipayment for the provision of surrogacy. Specifically, in November 1986 the NSW Law Reform Commission reported on the results of a national sample survey on aspects of surrogate motherhood arrangements. The survey found that '[T]here is clearly support among Australians for providing some form of payment to the surrogate mother. 40% of Australians would pay the surrogate mother her medical expenses plus an agreed fee. A further 34% considered that the surrogate mother should receive payment for medical expenses only. Only 17% though that there should be no payment at all.' 55 Now dated, this survey indicates that there is community support for the view that some degree of commercial surrogacy is acceptable to the community.
Empirical evidence as to harm of the practice of surrogacy
As previously noted in liberal theory the imposition of criminal law as punishment is legitimate when it is necessary to prevent harm.
Empirical evidence as to the harm of the practice upon the surrogate mother, the intending parents or the children born from surrogacy is ambiguous. 56 A recent study by Tamsin which examines existing empirical studies of surrogates 57 finds that the reality is that surrogates do not regret their decision, experience no psychological problems and express feelings of pride and accomplishment. 58 In the United States estimates are that 25000 women have given birth through surrogacy and that 99% of those have willingly relinquished the child and found the experience to be positive and that less than 1% of cases end up with disputed custody in the court system. 59 Further, since the passing of criminal laws in the 1980s empirical evidence as to the impact of surrogacy is buildingfor example current research confirms that children born through surrogacy are no worse or better off than children born through other means. 
Enforcement and effect of criminal law
The aim of the 1980s reports was not to centre the needs of infertile individuals or surrogate mothers. 61 Reproductive choice is however a profoundly personal area. Empirical regulatory research into whether compliance with rules is shaped by harsh penalties shows that the use of threat and legal authority (particularly when viewed as unreasonable) can produce the opposite behavior from that sought -with actions being 'more likely to result in non-compliance, creative compliance, criminal behavior or overt opposition.' 62 This would seem to apply to the application of criminal law to commercial surrogacy. History demonstrates that any restrictions placed upon the practice of surrogacy will be circumvented by individuals for whom surrogacy may afford their only chance to create a family. This reality is borne out by media reports and judicial decisions. Despite the existence of often high profile media cases where Australians have either jurisdiction shopped or used international commercial surrogacy agencies, there is also almost no 63 enforcement of the criminal prohibitions in Australia. For example, in Victoria the offences have not been used despite parents quite openly declaring to courts when seeking parentage orders that they have utilized commercial surrogates in the United States to have the child which is before the court. 64 Finally, an important outcome of the continued application of criminal penalties is to restrict debate and remove any possibility of constructive dialogue concerning the risks and benefits of the practice. In the absence of debate the assumed community consensus with respect to criminalising commercial surrogacy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Adults who have successfully pursued commercial surrogacy internationally or within Australia will not risk stigmatization to their children through attracting media attention or possible prosecution of themselves. Consensus with respect to the application of criminal law is then assumed as there is no lobby group campaigning for the decriminalisation of commercial surrogacy -and there will be no lobby group until the practice is decriminalised. The assertion that criminal law is appropriate for commercial surrogacy is then legitimized as it removes the possibility of proponents of successful commercial surrogacy arrangements having an opportunity to either explain their position or to communicate the risks and the benefits to others.
The ambiguity of the offence and the inconsistency of penalties
Surrogacy arrangements may be commercialized to varying degrees. At one end of the spectrum are informal arrangements in which no benefit is provided to the surrogate mother. At the other end are fully commercial contracts brokered by a professional surrogacy agency. In between there is a myriad of intermediate possibilities, such as relatively informal arrangements that nonetheless involve monetary or other benefits being provided to the surrogate mother. While there is escalating acceptance by Australian legislatures of reimbursement of expenses for altruistic surrogacy, the point at which an arrangement crosses from being altruistic to commercial is neither uniform nor clearly articulated in legislation:  In Western Australia section 6 of the Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) states that a surrogacy arrangement is effectively a commercial arrangement when it is '…for reward if the arrangement provides for any person to receive any payment or valuable consideration other than for reasonable expenses associated with (a) the pregnancy or the birth; or (b) any assessment or expert advice in connection with the arrangement.' Payments are alloable under section 7 which provides that an obligation under the surrogacy arrangement to reimburse reasonable expenses may be enforced. 'Reasonable expenses' in relation to the pregnancy include: costs associated with achieving, or attempting to achieve, the pregnancy as long as they a reasonable medical expense that is not recoverable under any health insurance or other scheme including related insurance and psychological counselling; the value of earnings foregone because of leave taken may also be reasonable as long as it is for a period of not more than 2 months during which the birth occurs or was expected to occur; or at any other time for medical reasons arising during the pregnancy.
There is thus wide jurisdictional disparity in the offences. For example, payments in Queensland that may be viewed as payments for 'reasonable medical expenses' may in South Australia attract a fine or imprisonment as the giving of valuable consideration.
Ambiguity also exists as to what amount 65 or form of payment may constitute a 'material benefit or advantage' in jurisdictions such as Victoria and Queensland or 'valuable consideration' in Western Australia and South Australia or 'fee or reward' in New South Wales. While it is possible to argue that a commercial payment in those jurisdictions arises when it takes place outside reimbursement of receipted expenses ambiguity arises as it is possible to view such payments as 'compensating' the surrogate mother for a costly act. In this sense such payments beyond receipted medical and legal expenses are not 'valuable consideration' nor are they 'a material benefit or advantage' nor are they a 'fee or reward'. Rather they compensate a woman for '…a twenty-four hour per day job that lasts for nine months. The job involves danger to the woman's life and health. There is no vacation time from this job, and there are few tangible perks. Clearly surrogates deserve compensation for their services.' 66 Australia is not alone in the legal conundrum of defining illegal expenses. International legislation reflects the difficulty of creating a dichotomy between the two forms of surrogacy. In the UK while section 2(1) of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 prohibits the negotiation of a surrogacy agreement 'on a commercial basis' and makes the facilitation of a surrogacy arrangement through advertising a criminal offence there is ambiguity as to what commercial surrogacy is. There is, as the Brazier report notes a recognition that 'surrogacy is, in effect, increasingly being practiced upon a commercial basis' 67 with typical payments being around 10 000 pounds. More recently in the UK an English couple who had a child with a paid surrogate in the Ukraine were prevented from returning to the UK with the child for several months until discretionary leave was granted by the Minister. 68 Notably, the case concluded that payment to the surrogate, which amounted to the cost of an apartment, satisfied the 'reasonable expense' criterion in the legislation. This allowed parentage rights to be granted under UK law. The court noted that a finding that the expenses were unreasonable would have had the effect of rendering the child stateless and parentless. 
CONCLUSION
Surrogacy has historically been a confronting practice. It is therefore not surprising that the state has reacted with condemnation to a form of family creation which brings a third party into reproduction, has the potential to be a commercial industry and fractures concepts of parenthood. As a biomedical development, commercial surrogacy emerged into an unregulated legal environment. 71 Essentially the current application of criminal 71 For example, the birth of Louise Brown on 25 July 1978 in England -the first child to be born using IVF -gave rise to an international anxiety about the new developments as the realisation dawned that assisted reproductive technologies had been left largely unregulated: see Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, 'Birds, the Bees, law to surrogacy in Australia originates from a form of 'legal moralism' whereby 1980s lawmakers enacted law prohibiting commercial surrogacy to prevent a future harm from arising and as a means of expressing certain values, rather than for the purpose of governing society. 72 While the practice of surrogacy necessarily means that policymakers must deal with complex and conflicting moral, ethical, political and scientific issues when choosing an appropriate regulatory vehicle it is nevertheless critical that the law be perceived to be in step with social, economic and technological change. Since the application of criminal law to commercial surrogacy thirty years ago, reproductive technologies have evolved from being experimental to being routine in the treatment of infertility. Commerce is now intimately integrated with the provision of fertility treatment in Australia and such treatment is seen as a social good in alleviating the 'harm' of infertility. 73 As Eggen notes 'governmental attitudes toward the advanced reproductive technologies is closely tied to societal attitudes towards infertility in general. Until recently, infertility was viewed as a social condition that affected a small, silent segment of the population, rather than as a medical problem of almost epidemic proportions.' 74 Surrogacy is becoming increasingly prevalent as a means of alleviating the emotional and psychological devastation brought on by a diagnosis of infertility. 75 In conclusion, this article calls for transparent review of a criminal penalty which has hitherto never been subject to public debate. This article does not predict that the outcome of a review of the criminalization of commercial surrogacy will result in a removal of criminal sanction. 76 Rather its aim is to caution against the continued application of what may well be outdated criminal policy with respect to commercial surrogacy given a fundamentally changed social, economic, technological and global environment.
